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ABSTRACT 
In this article we present an ethnomethodological study of a controversial case of 
‘friendly fire’ from the Iraq War in which leaked video footage, war on video, ac-
quired particular significance. We examine testimony given during a United States 
Air Force (USAF) investigation of the incident alongside transcribed excerpts from 
the video to make visible the methods employed by the investigators to assess the 
propriety of the actions of the pilots involved. With a focus on the way in which the 
USAF investigators pursued their own analysis of language-in-use in their discus-
sions with the pilots about what had been captured on the video, we turn attention 
to the background expectancies that analytical work was grounded in. These ‘ver-
nacular’ forms of video analysis and the expectancies which inform them constitute, 
we suggest, an inquiry into military culture from within that culture. As such, at-
tending to them provides insights into that culture. 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of studies in recent years have examined war on video from a range of 
different angles (see e.g. Gregory, 2011, 2015; Jayyusi, 2011; McSorley, 2012; 
2014; Mieszkowski, 2012; Nevile, 2013; Kirton, 2016; Kolanoski, 2017; Wilke, 
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2017). 1  In this article we make an ethnomethodological contribution to this 
emerging body of work by approaching war on video, following Garfinkel (1967), 
as a member’s phenomenon, i.e. as something taken up and examined within the 
military by the military in particular ways under particular conditions for partic-
ular practical purposes. Drawing on Garfinkel (1967; 2002), Sacks (1992), ordi-
nary language philosophy (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1962) and recent work 
by Vertesi (e.g., 2015), we do this with reference to a case of military action gone 
wrong: a ‘friendly fire’ attack during the Iraq War that became the centre of a 
transatlantic controversy in 2007 when video footage from the incident was 
leaked to the public during a legal inquest in the UK. In what follows, we present 
and analyse transcripts from the video as well as transcripts of exchanges which 
centred on the video between United States Air Force (USAF) investigators and the 
pilots involved in the incident. Pairing the video with the vernacular ‘video ana-
lytic’ work the USAF investigators were engaged in (Tuma, 2012; Elsey, Mair, 
Smith and Watson, 2016; Mair, Elsey, Smith and Watson, 2016), we argue these 
exchanges make visible certain background expectancies against which soldierly 
conduct in war is assessed. Through an examination of the methods the USAF 
investigators employed to make sense of the events captured on the video, we are 
interested in exploring how it is possible to find someone to have exhibited ‘com-
petence’ despite having done something no ‘competent’ pilot should do, namely 
kill their fellow soldiers. We are interested, in other words, in exploring “what is 
at stake” (Vertesi, 2015: 8) in particular ways of methodically working through 
instances of war on video. That analytic work, we will argue borrowing from Ver-
tesi, shows us “where … commitments lie” (Vertesi, 2015: 97). 
VIDEO AND THE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY CULTURES 
Video is now recorded as a matter of course during military operations and can 
be pressed into service for a range of projects and ends, from surveillance and 
targeting through diagnostics and error-finding to public relations and propa-
ganda. Depending on the circumstances and the hands it happens to be in, the 
same footage can show, highlight or focus attention on different things; it is not 
typically exhausted by the uses to which it is put on any particular occasion but 
remains open to alternative uses (Mair, Elsey, Smith and Watson, 2016). Given the 
range of possibilities in play, the specific ways in which particular videos are actu-
ally used on any particular occasion not only therefore say something about the 
                                               
1 These are profitably read alongside studies which reflect on the accountable intelligibility within 
the military of such things as cultural awareness guidance issued to soldiers (Brown, 2008; Ansorge 
and Barkawi, 2014), counter-insurgency field manuals (Ansorge, 2010), maps and representations 
of the battlefield (King, 2006; Saint Amour, 2011) or military memoirs (Woodward and Jenkings, 
2018). 
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specific situation they are used within but also about who is using them. As Vertesi 
(2015: 101) puts the point: 
If seeing is social and … [different] practices produce and reproduce ... [particular] 
modes of seeing, then how we [see the world] … is not just a question of what … 
[the world] is like … it is about what we understand … [the world] to be like. 
Extending this to the present context, we suggest exercises in viewing and mak-
ing sense of, here, combat footage within the military can be treated as opportu-
nities to explore how the military understands its engagements in and with the 
world. An examination of how the footage of the friendly fire incident introduced 
above was treated in the course of the military inquiry enables us to develop this 
point empirically. Showing the incident as it unfolded, the leaked footage high-
lighted not the military’s successes but its internal operational fragilities – the dif-
ficulties associated with even such seemingly elementary combat-specific tasks as 
distinguishing friend from foe – and thus offers a rather different view to the vid-
eos released to the media during military press briefings or by soldiers on social 
networking sites (McSorley, 2014; Kirton, 2016). In order to open up issues of 
military culture with reference to that video, our aim is to examine how the USAF 
interrogated this footage in order to make sense of the incident and why it took 
place, focusing, in particular, on material from the published report of the princi-
pal military inquiry convened to investigate it – a USAF Friendly Fire Investigation 
Board. As an inquiry into the culture from within the culture, we are interested in 
working through what that inquiry might have to tell us about the culture (Gar-
finkel, 1967: 76-77; Coulter, 1979: 10-11; Eglin, 1980; Wieder and Pratt, 1990: 
46; Hester and Eglin, 1997: 20; McHoul, 2004; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2009: 
346; Sharrock and Anderson 2011: 47).2 
                                               
2 Our study also takes up and develops debates about the “extraordinary relations” between expe-
rience and testimony raised by Lynch and Bogen (Bogen and Lynch, 1989: 204; Lynch and Bogen, 
1996, see Chapter 6 esp.) in relation to their study of the Iran-Contra hearings and by Goodwin’s 
(1994) study of the video analytic work performed under cross examination by expert witnesses 
working for the Los Angeles Police Department on the Rodney King beating tape at the first trial of 
the officers involved. We have discussed these important studies in relation to this case elsewhere 
(Mair, Elsey, Watson and Smith, 2013), however, our analysis here moves in a different direction to 
both. Not all video analytic work is the same (Mair, Elsey, Smith and Watson, 2016) and it is im-
portant to note that the setting we are dealing with here was not an adversarial, public and highly 
politicised inquiry or courtroom but a behind-closed-doors ‘diagnostic’ session designed to deter-
mine what went wrong in this specific incident that was never intended to be made public – due to 
the known sensitivities surrounding such incidents, sensitivities we discuss further below. What 
struck us, and what we wanted to focus on for present purposes, is that this was a group of people 
analysing ‘themselves’ among ‘themselves’, something which itself fuelled public indignation when it 
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INVESTIGATING MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM WITHIN 
In the late afternoon of Friday the 28th March 2003, eight days into the invasion 
of Iraq, two US A10 warplanes launched an attack on a convoy of British ar-
moured vehicles, which they had mistaken for an Iraqi force, killing L. Cpl. Mat-
thew Hull, injuring five other soldiers and seriously damaging two of the vehicles 
they were travelling in. The incident, like many other ‘friendly fire’ attacks, proved 
highly controversial (see, e.g., Snook, 2002; Hart, 2004; Molloy, 2005; McHoul, 
2007; Masys, 2008; Caddell, 2010; Nevile, 2013; Kirke, 2012; Mair, Watson, El-
sey and Smith, 2012). However, in this case, the controversy was fuelled by the 
unprecedented level of access non-military observers gained to details of the inci-
dent itself.  
Access was gained, first, via the leaked video, which showed the events that led 
up to the attack from the cockpit of one of the two pilots involved; the pilot who 
actually fired on the convoy having received clearance to do so from the flight 
lead. Second, and as a result of the mounting political pressure that followed the 
video’s release, the official incident reports produced by the US Air Force’s Friendly 
Fire Investigation Board (hereafter, ‘the Board’) and the UK’s Ministry of Defence 
Board of Inquiry were (partially) declassified, placing a wealth of additional infor-
mation relating to the incident in the public domain.  
The British and American militaries did not come out of the disclosures well 
(McHoul, 2007; Kirke, 2012). The official claim, jointly made, that no-one was 
ultimately to blame for the attack – because the attack was an accident – was 
subjected to fierce criticism, particularly as it seemed to ignore the evidence pro-
vided by the video which showed that the pilots had deliberately fired upon the 
convoy after failing to identify the vehicles correctly. The conclusions of the British 
Coroner, Andrew Walker, the UK legal official charged with establishing the cause 
of L. Cpl. Hull’s death in 2007, sought to overturn the military account. Focusing 
on the legal rights and wrongs of the initiation of the attack itself as the incident’s 
central and defining act, his verdict was that it had resulted in an “unlawful kill-
ing”, a killing for which the pilots and those whose command they were under 
could be held legally and morally responsible and criminally charged with by the 
relevant authorities should they have decided to proceed against them (Crown, 
2007; Mair, Watson, Elsey and Smith, 2012). 
                                               
came to light during the Coroner’s inquest. In some respects, then, Goffman’s sketch of the “work-
shop complex” (1961: 293-297) and Wieder’s (1974) study of the practical work of telling the con-
vict code as an example of culture-in-action are as closely related to this study as Lynch and Bogen’s 
analysis of Oliver North’s ‘practical deconstructionism’ or Goodwin’s examination of ‘professional 
vision’. 
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Fratricidal deaths, unintentional killings of soldiers by their fellow soldiers 
through ‘friendly fire’, breach ordinary expectations about death in combat.3 It is 
a problem that is regarded with seriousness, one whose occurrence carries out-
wards from military into public domains. That friendly fire happens at all sits 
awkwardly with understandings about how soldiers are ‘meant’ to die, i.e. in battle 
against designated enemies rather than at the hands of those around them.4 How-
ever, and at the same time, within military circles, it is also widely held to be un-
preventable due to the ways wars are fought (Hart, 2004; Kirke, 2012). Perhaps 
in recognition of this, few soldiers are prosecuted when it occurs. Despite being 
estimated to account for somewhere between 10-15% of all combat deaths in all 
conflicts (Kirke, 2012), few friendly fire cases in the US military – one of the big-
gest and most active militaries in the world with the largest numbers of friendly 
fire deaths accordingly – ever result in court martial prosecutions, and those that 
do tend to be overturned in appeal (Davidson, 2011). This holds for attacks by US 
service personnel on other US personnel as much as it does for attacks on, for 
example, NATO allies.  
Against this background, what makes the incident we have chosen to focus on 
particularly interesting is that it affords rare insight into how specific cases of 
friendly fire, and the activities which lead to them, are evaluated, judged and ac-
counted for. We have a case here in which we can examine how it is possible for 
military operatives, when seen from within the culture, to be acknowledged to 
have acted wrongly while not being held to have been in the wrong for having 
done so. As this is one of the few occasions where such reasoning, as well as the 
investigative and evaluative practices which support it and provide its warrant, 
have been made publicly available, it is worth extended consideration. By exam-
ining the case we can, to adapt Wieder and Pratt (1990: 46), explore how someone 
can remain a recognisably ‘competent’ member of the USAF among other ‘compe-
tent’ members despite having done something which all recognise no ‘competent’ 
member of that culture should do.  
                                               
3 We are not going to set out a definition of ‘friendly fire’ here, however see Mair, Watson, Elsey and 
Smith (2012) as well as Kirke (2012) for extensive discussions. The USAF definition, relevant to 
what follows as it supplied the grounds for the inquiry we shall examine, is as follows: “Friendly 
fire: A circumstance in which members of a U.S. or friendly military force are mistakenly or acci-
dentally killed or injured in action by U.S. or friendly military forces actively engaged with an enemy 
or who are actively directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force.” (USAF, 
2003: 2). 
4 As do, for example, the high numbers of accidental deaths that occur among serving soldiers, with 
accidents accounting for just over 26% of all service deaths in the UK in 2016 and generally ranging 
from between a fifth (20%) to a quarter (25%) of deaths over time (see MOD, 2017, and Eulriet, 
2014 for a sociological perspective). 
88     Mair et al 
We want to concentrate upon the prominent role played by analyses of video 
in the judgements of the Board investigators in order to further explore the rela-
tionship between action and recognition Wieder and Pratt point to (and see also 
Sacks, 1992: 221, 226). By methodically attending to different aspects of the ac-
tivities in question with reference to the audio-video and its explication in cross-
examination, following the investigators own methodic practices in so doing, we 
can examine how the Board made links between notions of responsibility and un-
derstandings of the practices being a (competent) pilot might be said to have been 
exhibited by in this specific case.  
In order to examine the Board’s evaluative practices, we will analyse tran-
scribed excerpts of cockpit footage from the incident itself alongside oral testi-
mony, gathered under questioning, in which Board investigators asked the pilots 
involved – POPOFF 3/5 and 3/6 – to talk them through what the video could be 
locally, accountably and relevantly said to show (USAF, 2003: Tab G).5 Focusing 
on how the Board pursued the phrase “well clear” in the video, our interest is in 
how particular video-commentary ‘pairs’ (Garfinkel, 2002) were worked up in the 
investigation and used to ground judgements about what the pilots had and had 
not done. Our focus is, therefore, the methods these investigators employed to 
draw conclusions about what had produced this particular “context for error” 
(Heritage and Clayman, 2012). This is instructive in two senses. First, by analysing 
these practices, local forms of vernacular video analysis, we learn something about 
what is involved when military operatives are held to account (morally, legally, 
procedurally, etc.) by “cultural colleagues” (Garfinkel, 1967: 11). But, second, we 
also learn about what is involved in opening ‘military work’ up to view, making it 
account-able, i.e. observable-reportable (Garfinkel, 1967), and so available for in-
spection and evaluation in military settings but also beyond. 
What we are working with, then, is a situation in which questions about sanc-
tionable conduct as they arise in combat situations were themselves explored as 
part of an occasioned investigation undertaken for specific practical purposes – an 
investigation into how this particular incident came to happen and why (Gar-
finkel, 1967). This was an investigation into the military from within and is illu-
minating for that very reason: given the circumstances, the Board’s inquiries pro-
vide a perspicuous setting for a study of the ways in which military operations are 
made visible, intelligible and accountable as undertakings of the military (as op-
posed to, e.g., rogue individuals acting outside the legitimate scope of sanctionable 
military action) (Lynch, 1993: 231; Garfinkel, 2002: 181-182).6 
                                               
5 The only time the pilots were captured on public record and so the only situation where we hear 
them speak for themselves rather than hearing others speaking on their behalf. 
6 Friendly fire is not an act like the summary execution of positively identified non-combatants which 
is always deemed to be wrong by both cultural colleagues and external auditors. Killing one’s fellows 
can indeed be deemed to be wrong just as killing civilians can. In any actual case, however, it is up 
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We begin our examination of how the Board investigators went about their 
specific investigative task by briefly discussing the report’s central findings. We 
then move on to examine the sections of the cockpit video that the investigators 
played to the pilots for comment, using excerpts from our own version of the 
official incident transcript which has been modified to reflect who was speaking 
to whom at any given moment in time (Mair, Elsey, Smith and Watson, 2014; Elsey, 
Mair, Smith and Watson, 2016), paired with the questioning itself.7 This analysis, 
a study of vernacular video analytic work, offers a distinctive ethnomethodologi-
cal approach to the analysis of military culture.8 
THE MILITARY INVESTIGATOR AS VIDEO ANALYST  
The Board was charged, as US law requires, with responsibility for examining “all 
the facts and circumstances” surrounding the incident (USAF, 2003: 1). In their 
attempt to determine how the pilots came to mistake the British force for an Iraqi 
one, a particular focus of the questions the Board investigators put to the pilots 
concerned what had happened from the moment they first sighted the vehicles, 
including the steps they had subsequently taken to establish whether they were 
friendly or hostile. The Board’s report clearly states that ‘what happened’ was 
never in dispute.9 The pilots themselves recognised they had mistaken their allies 
for enemies as soon as they saw the release of blue smoke – indicating friendly 
vehicles – from the targets on the ground after their attack. As their acknowledged 
starting point, the Board’s task was to work out how and why this mistake oc-
curred, an investigative task in which inspection of the cockpit video and the com-
municative activity contained within it played a central role.  
                                               
to the investigators as to whether it was in fact wrong. Such judgements are not automatic nor are 
they unprincipled. Any examination of these extensive investigations will quickly attest they are 
undertaken in good faith. It is the specific manner in which the pilots in this case were absolved of 
possible blame that is our interest here. 
7 We also recommend readers watch the publicly available video here, particularly the first 8 minutes: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Friendly_Fire_Iraq.ogv. For transcript conventions and a 
glossary of the military terminology used, see Mair, Elsey, Smith and Watson (2014). 
8 From our perspective, military cultures, such as they are, find public expression in precisely these 
kinds of ways, i.e. in the handling of artefacts like flight video recordings and through procedures 
for making sense of the events they recover in particular sites of inquiry. They are not ‘in’ psycho-
logical attitudes or organisational structures but are, rather, constituted by practices and methods 
for making war and assessing its conduct. 
9 That the pilots saw the British as an Iraqi patrol was not contested. How they came to do so, 
however, was contested, with the UK Coroner and military inquiries offering divergent, indeed com-
peting accounts. 
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Drawing together the evidence gathered in the course of their inquiries, the 
Board ultimately concluded that the pilots misidentified the British troops due to 
misunderstandings that arose as a consequence of what the Board termed “unde-
fined or non-standard terminology” (USAF, 2003: 26). One phrase in particular, 
“well clear”, was the subject of extensive scrutiny. Our interest is in what their 
scrutiny of the use of this phrase tells us about the background expectancies the 
identification of misunderstanding and its causes rested on in this context (Scheg-
loff, 1987). It is this background evaluative work we wish to bring out. In order 
to do so, we will focus on the phrase “well clear” and trace the way in which 
questions connected to its meaning were pursued in the Board’s inquiries, an anal-
ysis enabled by working between the video and the transcribed testimony. We start 
with its first appearance in the cockpit video. 
 
                     Air to Ground                 Air to Air 
 
?  1  MANILA HOTEL    Eh POPOFF from 
  2                  MANILA HOTEL, can 
  3                  you confirm you 
  4                  engaged that eh tube 
  5                  and those vehicles? 
  6                  {Automated message} 
  7                  (1) 
  8  POPOFF 3/5      Affirm Sir. Looks like I 
  9                  have multiple vehicles 
 10                  in revets about 
 11                  {inhales} uk 800 
 12                  meters to the north of 
 13                  your arty rounds. Can 
 14                  you eh switch fire, an 
 15                  uhm, shift fire, try and 
 16                  get some arty rounds 
 17                  on those? 
 18                  (1) 
 19  MANILA HOTEL    Roger, I understand 
 20                  those were the impacts 
 21                  that uh you observed 
 22                  earlier on my timing? 
 23                  (>1) 
 24  POPOFF 3/5      Affirmative 
 25                  (>1) 
 26  MANILA HOTEL    Roger, standby. Let me 
 27                  make sure they’re not 
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 28                  on another mission 
 29                  (1) 
? 30  POPOFF 3/6                                    Hey, I got a four ship. 
 31                                                Uh looks like we got 
 32                                                orange panels on ’em 
 33                                                though. Do they have 
 34                                                any uh, any eh, 
 35                                                friendlies up in this 
 36                                                area? 
 37                  = 
 38  MANILA HOTEL    I understand that was 
 39                  north 800 meters 
 40                  (3) 
 41  MANILA HOTEL    POPOFF, understand 
 42                  that was north 800 
 43                  meters? 
 44                  (2) 
? 45  POPOFF 3/5      Confirm, north 800 
 46                  meters. {Automated 
 47                  message}. Confirm no 
 48                  friendlies this far north 
 49                  uh. On the ground 
 50                  (1) 
? 51  MANILA HOTEL    That is an affirm. 
 52                  {Distortion, static} 
 53                  You are well clear of 
 54                  friendlies 
 55                  (.) 
 56  POPOFF 3/5      Copy 
 57                  ((lines omitted)) 
 58  POPOFF 3/5                                    Hey dude 
 59                                                (2) 
 60  POPOFF 3/6                                    I got a four ship of uh 
 61                                                vehicles that’re evenly 
 62                                                spaced eh along a eh 
 63                                                road going north 
 64                                                ((lines omitted)) 
 65  POPOFF 3/6                                    They look like they 
 66                                                have orange panels on 
 67                                                ’em though 
 68                                                (1) 
? 69  POPOFF 3/5                                    He told me, he told me 
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 70                                                there’s nobody north of 
 71                                                here. No friendlies 
Excerpt 1: Extract from video 
 
Excerpt one, covering the opening exchanges of that section of the cockpit 
video in the public domain, involves the three main protagonists involved in this 
particular incident: the two pilots of POPOFF flight, POPOFF 3/5 and POPOFF 
3/6, flight lead and ‘wingman’ respectively; and MANILA HOTEL, the ‘Ground 
Forward Air Controller’ or GFAC that the pilots of POPOFF flight were working 
with in order to provide ‘close air support’ to Coalition forces in and around an 
area to the north west of Basra. As the Board report revealed, Excerpt one begins 
moments after POPOFF 3/5 completed a successful attack run, coordinated with 
MANILA HOTEL, against Iraqi missile launchers – had the video started 30 sec-
onds earlier, POPOFF 3/5 would have been captured in the moment of firing. At 
the start of the excerpt, MANILA HOTEL checks in with POPOFF 3/5 to confirm 
the attack had been successful. POPOFF 3/5 confirms it had and then directs MA-
NILA HOTEL’s attention to a secondary target, a group of Iraqi vehicles occupy-
ing a fortified embankment, asking him to order a switch in artillery fire from the 
previous target (the one POPOFF 3/5 had just destroyed) to this new one, a short 
800 meters to the north.  
Just after MANILA HOTEL signs off to contact the artillery unit, POPOFF 3/6 
tells POPOFF 3/5 he has spotted a convoy of four vehicles (a ‘four ship’, the British 
patrol) some 2-3km to the west of the targets they have just engaged. Although it 
was not standard issue, the vehicles had what looked to be orange panelling, some-
thing Coalition forces use to signal their friendly status to aerial support. As these 
may well have been Coalition troops, POPOFF 3/6 asks POPOFF 3/5, who was 
responsible for air-to-ground communication, to ask MANILA HOTEL on the 
air-to-ground radio channel if there are any friendly forces in the area. POPOFF 
3/5 duly does so and MANILA HOTEL, at lines 53-54, assures him they are “well 
clear”.  
The problem is, however, that MANILA HOTEL had not been informed of the 
location of these new targets or even that there were new targets because he had 
not heard the discussion on what was an air-to-air channel only. Which area was 
clear of friendlies was, therefore, never exactly specified. As the video shows, from 
this point on the pilots worked on the assumption that it was the area they were 
currently in, not the area they had just attacked. It was this locational misunder-
standing, one which was interactionally embedded in the course of their exchanges 
with MANILA HOTEL, that led the pilots to misidentify the British troops in the 
belief they had to be hostile (as they could not be friendly given the assurances 
received). How this initial exchange was taken up by the Board can be seen in 
excerpts two and three below. 
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 1  Board investigator  They let you know that in that area you’ll be well  
 2                      clear of friendlies. When somebody tells you that, what 
 3                      does that bring up in your mind? What does that mean to 
 4                      you? 
 5  POPOFF 3/5          It means that, in my mind, well clear means that I can 
 6                      concentrate on the tactics of how I’m going to kill 
 7                      that target. And look at the run-ins relative to wind, 
 8                      sun-angle, that kind of stuff … that’s what I’m looking 
 9                      at primarily … 
10  Board investigator  Is there any kind of a number? Or distance that you 
11                      attach to that? 
12  POPOFF 3/5          I mean, if I was going to pick a number, I’d say 4–5 
13                      klies [km] away, is … ish 
14  Board investigator  Approximately somewhere in there? 
15  POPOFF 3/5          Yes. 
Excerpt 2: Extract from POPOFF 3/5’s testimony (USAF, 2003: G7–G8) 
 
 1  Board investigator  So they [the ‘four ship’] were on the north-south road 
 2                      … Can you describe what the vehicles looked like? 
 3  POPOFF 3/6          There were four vehicles, rectangular in shape and they 
 4                      were spaced out probably a couple, a hundred meters or 
 5                      so apart. They were heading north. 
 6  Board investigator  [We] hear well clear friendlies. To your mind that’s 
 7                      meaning what? 
 8  POPOFF 3/6          That means there’s no one in this whole area that we’re 
 9                      supposed to be attacking, in this complex here. 
10                      Shouldn’t be, as far as initially there. That there’s 
11                      no one in that area. 
Excerpt 3: Extract from POPOFF 3/6’s testimony (USAF, 2003: G33) 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the central role of locational misunderstandings in the 
incident, the Board investigators were keen to understand what had generated and 
sustained them.10 As Excerpts one, two and three demonstrate, their attempts to 
pin down the meaning of the phrase “well clear” from the pilots’ perspective took 
them onto interpretive terrain as they sought to ascertain not just what the phrase 
‘meant’ but also what consequences its use had in the context of the incident as a 
whole.  
Excerpts two and three show the investigators, through their questioning of the 
pilots, seeking ‘instructions’ on how the pilots, at the time, had heard and 
                                               
10 For an account of the pilots’ movement across and around this particular part of what was a much 
wider, dispersed and fragmented ‘battle space’ see Nevile’s innovative reconstruction (2013). 
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understood the phrase (Garfinkel, 1967). This line of questioning was not simply 
pursued to help them decode the phrase in literal terms however. Had they been 
interested in establishing a general working definition, this would conceivably 
have been enough but they also focused on the action the phrase was woven into. 
That is, they sought to work out how it appeared in and became relevant to the 
actions of the participants at the time, and these initial exchanges paved the way 
for further inquiries designed to establish the practical conditions under which the 
use of these words had ‘done’ certain things (Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1962; 
Garfinkel, 1967; Fish, 1978).  
In order to gain a better understanding of how the category “well clear” had 
specifically worked to shape the pilots’ actions in this particular case, they sought 
to understand the wider activities it was employed within (Coulter, 1979: 44). In 
pursuing that understanding, they opened up the work the pilots had engaged in 
before attacking the British troops. This led them, among other things, to examine 
differences in successive instances of the employment of “well clear”. This is best 
brought out in a further pairing, beginning with Excerpt four. 
 
                     Air to Ground                 Air to Air 
 
  1  POPOFF 3/5      POPOFF for MANILA 3, 
  2                  is MANILA 3/4 in this eh 
  3                  area? 
  4                  (3) 
  5  MANILA HOTEL     Eh say again? 
  6                  (.) 
  7  POPOFF 3/5      MANILA HOTEL, is 
  8                  MANILA 3/4 in this area? 
  9                  (1) 
 10  MANILA HOTEL    Eh negative. Understand 
 11                  they are well clear of that 
 12                  now. 
 13                  (2) 
 14  POPOFF 3/4      OK, copy 
Excerpt 4: Extract from video 
 
Faced with the incongruity of the orange panelling, the mark of a friendly force, 
the pilots had to work to reconcile what they were seeing with what they thought 
they had been told – that there were no friendly forces nearby. They did not pro-
ceed directly to attack, taking the information they had been given for granted, 
but took additional precautions, initiating further checks to confirm the vehicles 
on the ground were definitely not friendlies. In Excerpt four, we see POPOFF 3/5 
try again. Having undertaken several visual checks on the convoy, checks that did 
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little to clarify the ambiguous, indeterminate status of the vehicles’ orange panel-
ling, which stubbornly refused to resolve into something either categorically 
friendly or categorically hostile, POPOFF 3/5 takes a different tack. Rather than 
ask MANILA HOTEL directly about the presence of friendly forces, he asks him 
whether another GFAC, MANILA 3/4, and thus the infantry force he was embed-
ded with, might still be in the area. Once again, the answer appears definitive: 
“they are well clear of that now”. Once again, however, what being clear of “that” 
actually means is not settled and the pilots continue to assume MANILA HOTEL 
is referring to their position, a position he was not in fact aware of.  
During the inquiry POPOFF 3/5 was queried on this exchange: “You ask about 
MANILA 3/4, and the reason for that [was]? (USAF, 2003: G14). POPOFF 3/5’s 
response demonstrated the additional confirmatory work involved: “He [POPOFF 
3/6] sees military vehicles with orange panels, and I’m thinking maybe friendlies 
are here for some, somehow they got in here. So the only friendlies I thought of 
that could be here was MANILA 3/4. Somehow they strayed in there, so, that’s 
why I called for his position.” 
However, attempts to definitively resolve the ambiguities of “well clear” did not 
end there, or with POPOFF 3/5. POPOFF 3/6 also attempted to take the matter 
up with MANILA HOTEL again, and again indirectly, as we see in Excerpt five. 
 
                     Air to Ground                 Air to Air 
 
  1  POPOFF 3/6                                    Let me ask you one 
  2                                                question 
  3                                                (.) 
  4  POPOFF 3/5                                    What’s that? 
  5                                                (.) 
  6                                                The question is 
  7                  = 
  8  MANILA HOTEL    (An I need a first shot on 
  9                  that eh adjustment from 
 10                  you, north, the previous 
 11                  impact) {beep, beep} 
 12                  (3) 
 13  POPOFF 3/6      {To MANILA HOTEL} 
 14                  Hey, tell me what type of 
 15                  rocket launchers you got 
 16                  up here? 
 17                  (5) 
 18  POPOFF 3/6                                    {To POPOFF 3/5} I think 
 19                                                they’re rocket launchers 
 20                                                (1) 
96     Mair et al 
 21  MANILA HOTEL    {Distortion} MANILA 
 22                  HOTEL, you were stepped 
 23                  on, say again 
Excerpt 5: Extract from video 
 
Although they had been given “blanket release” by MANILA HOTEL to attack 
any non-friendly targets they identified in the area of the “kill box” they had been 
called in to patrol (USAF 2003: 8; Mair, Watson, Elsey and Smith, 2012), the pilots 
continued to hold back. Working together, and in light of further reassurances 
regarding the location of “friendlies”, they eventually concluded that the make-
shift panelling that the British troops had used to augment the standard issue or-
ange strips on their vehicles had to be some kind of Iraqi weapons system. Based 
on this, in Excerpt five we find the pilots conferring, with POPOFF 3/6 about to 
put a question to POPOFF 3/5 when he is interrupted by MANILA HOTEL, who 
cuts in to request support for the artillery fire he is attempting to train on the 
fortified embankment that POPOFF 3/5 had brought to his attention in Excerpt 
one. POPOFF 3/6 takes this opportunity to ask MANILA HOTEL, on the only 
occasion he addresses him directly, about the weapons systems Iraqi forces might 
be deploying in this area, in an attempt to find out whether the orange panels 
might be rocket launchers. This may not look like a check on the presence of 
friendly forces but it works in that way. Coalition forces do not employ rocket 
launchers on vehicles so a confirmation that rocket launchers were being used in 
the area would rule out the presence of ‘friendlies’. The reverse holds true too: 
were MANILA HOTEL to have let them know there were no rocket launchers in 
the area, this would have ruled out the convoy as a threat.  
However, due to radio interference, MANILA HOTEL did not get to hear 
POPOFF 3/6’s request for further information and the question was not repeated. 
Nor was MANILA HOTEL, as he had not been informed of the presence of the 
‘four ship’, in any position to query what this interrupted talk of rocket as opposed 
to missile launchers (the targets he was aware of and all talk to now had focused 
on) might have been about. By now convinced that they were dealing with a group 
of vehicles armed with rocket launchers attempting to flee the area in order to 
regroup a safe distance from Coalition forces, POPOFF 3/5 cleared POPOFF 3/6 
to attack. Approximately four minutes after the vehicles were first sighted, 
POPOFF 3/6 thus launched the first of the two attack runs which resulted in the 
death of L. Cpl. Hull.  
Another crucial moment, then, one involving another indirect attempt to con-
firm who might be where, this was also examined by the Board. POPOFF 3/6 was 
asked specifically: “you’re asking MANILA HOTEL what kind of rocket launch-
ers they have up there. Is that correct?” In reply POPOFF 3/6 stated: “I think it 
was ... to POPOFF [3/5] ... I can’t remember who it was that I was asking that 
question.” (USAF, 2003: G35).  
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What is notable about this exchange is that the deep seated and ramifying mis-
alignments between pilot and ground which characterised this incident made it 
difficult for the pilots themselves to make sense of what was going on in the ex-
changes after the fact. As Young notes: “[if] the acts of individuals who assume 
they are engaged in coordinated social interaction are not properly aligned with 
each other, interaction becomes problematic” (1995: 252; see also Schegloff, 
1987). Here we see the consequences of such misalignments in battlefield condi-
tions, namely a locally produced “fracture” (Mort and Smith, 2009: 223) in its 
complex ecologies of action and interaction that resulted in all parties losing track 
of what was going on – a fracture with fateful consequences. 
LOCATION REQUESTING AND REPORTING 
AS A MARKER OF COMPETENCE 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the Board repeatedly sought to clarify 
how the phrase “well clear” was serially (mis)understood during the incident. In 
so doing, their questioning sought and elicited commentaries on the courses of 
action within which the succession of requests by the pilots concerning the loca-
tion of friendly forces had been embedded. This shifts the focus from any 
standalone meaning the phrase “well clear” might putatively be thought to possess 
(Fish, 1978, Goffman, 1981), to what was practically involved in the act of posing 
questions which received “well clear” as their answer as the incident unfolded. The 
exchanges with the investigators allow us to see, for instance, that while the pilots 
did receive assurances they were ‘well clear’ twice, they actually sought reassur-
ance on three occasions: firstly by asking whether there were any friendlies nearby, 
then by asking whether particular friendlies were nearby and finally by attempting 
to ask about the specific type of enemy armaments in the area.  
When these exchanges are examined in terms of what the requests for the lo-
cation of friendly forces were doing in practical terms, they thus make visible the 
work of identifying the unknown force by progressively building up a characteri-
sation of it through a series of confirmatory and disconfirmatory checks (Smith, 
1978). In the Board’s questioning, the sequential and categorical features of those 
actions and interactions are explored together and treated as intertwined. As a 
consequence, location requesting emerges as more than ‘just talk’: it is instead an 
example of language-in-use tied to the “settinged activities” (Sacks, 1992: 512-
522) within which location requesting and reporting acquired practical signifi-
cance – in this case ‘securing an area for infantry from the air’, the objective of 
close air support. 
Handling the complexities of those activities in their midst, and engaging in 
checks while doing so, is precisely what the Board’s examination of the video with 
the pilots shows is expected of competent military personnel – it is this back-
ground set of expectancies, we suggest, that are made available in and through the 
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Board investigator’s questioning; it is what they were engaged in checking for as 
they progressively worked through the video.  
Additionally, what the exchanges show is that understanding is not being 
treated solely as a matter of the ‘correct’ terminology in this context – any more 
than misunderstanding is solely a matter of its ‘incorrect’ usage. Understanding, 
like misunderstanding, is, instead, here treated as accountably woven into, and 
consequential as part of, the collaborative accomplishment of the specific tasks 
military personnel were engaged in performing. Based on this, we come to see why 
the use of arguably more ‘precise’ forms of language, like coordinates, may be no 
guarantee of mutual understanding either – they too can fail to mesh with collab-
orative activities and so lose their sense within them (see also Whalen, Zimmerman 
and Whalen, 1988; Froholdt, 2010, 2015). This comes across very clearly in Ex-
cerpt six below. 
 
 1  Board investigator  So you were actually given co-ordinates that were close 
 2                      to 3724 and you actually picked up the target based on 
 3                      the talk on more of a 380235, would that be accurate? 
 4  POPOFF 3/6          It’d be about 378 yeah, 235. [Reference page H-3, Pilot 
 5                      Interview Co-ordinates Map Red Plot #3] 
 6  Board investigator  OK. 
 7  POPOFF 3/6          So, it was a good ways away from what the actual 
 8                      co-ordinates were. And as he described it all the GFAC, 
 9                      they were saying yeah that’s the target, and so, I 
10                      mean, they kept on moving south and east of the 
11                      original co-ordinates, I mean by quite a ways as you 
12                      can see here, from where the rockets were put in and 
13                      trying to get talk-ons and they say yeah shoot there 
14                      and it turns out that’s not the right one and then 
15                      finally they got us all the way down to in this area. 
16  Board investigator  Over into the 378235 area? OK, and did that cause some 
17                      confusion to have them reference the … 
18  POPOFF 3/6          Oh, it did. 
Excerpt 6: Extract from testimony (USAF, 2003: G27) 
 
Not only can the use of seemingly precise coordinates actually exacerbate con-
fusion, as Excerpt six demonstrates, they can also fail to definitively dispel it. As 
the video shows, in the aftermath of the attack the pilots were contacted by several 
parties telling them there was “friendly armour” in their area and that they were 
involved in a “blue-on-blue” situation and should desist (see Mair, Elsey, Smith 
and Watson (2014) for further discussion). Coordinates were given several times 
as part of this. However, it was not until the pilots saw blue smoke that what they 
had just done was finally brought home to them. 
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As Sharrock has noted: “a notion is not too ‘vague’, it is too vague for some 
purpose or use” (Sharrock, cited in Tsilipakos, 2012: 175, see also Wittgenstein, 
1953: §88). In other words, whether something is vague or imprecise (or the re-
verse) is not something that can be decided outside specific practices, interactions 
and settings. Whether a phrase like “well clear” or a set of coordinates is fit for 
the task at hand is practically determined in the course of using it. In this incident, 
the competent (though erroneous) use of locational formulations like “well clear” 
was found by the Board to be embedded in the temporally organised courses of 
practical action, produced in and through direct and indirect collaboration with 
others, that are culturally understood and taken-for-granted features of live com-
bat operations. Their use was part and parcel of ‘clearing the area of hostiles’ in 
this case – the course of action the pilots wrongly believed themselves to be en-
gaged in and which they wrongly thought they had been understood by others to 
be engaged in too.11 
Working within the interpretive schemas supplied by these background expec-
tancies and orienting to the competencies the pilots would have been expected to 
display in proceeding as they did (e.g., showing appropriate reticence, not rushing 
to engage, checking and checking again, and so on), the Board was thus able to 
find, on the basis of the evidence of the video, that despite the incident’s outcome, 
the pilots had acted properly given what they had been told and had reasonably 
understood by what they had been told. In contrast to the UK Coroner’s methods 
of working with the video, here the ‘competence’ exhibited by the pilots in their 
locational checks becomes the focus while the rights and wrongs of the outcome, 
the fatal attack, are de-emphasised. That an attack produces the ‘wrong’ deaths, 
in other words, is not the primary issue: it is whether that attack came about and 
was undertaken in the ‘right’ way given what is expected of military personnel in 
such contexts. ‘Wrong deaths’, that is, are revealed in this cultural setting to be 
deaths that come about due to ‘wrong procedure’ not due to the killing of the 
‘wrong people’.12 On these grounds, L.Cpl. Matthew Hull’s death could be found 
to be normal or routine, i.e. an outcome of what competent pilots normally and 
routinely do. 
CONCLUSION: WAR ON VIDEO AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON 
In order to make sense of the pilots’ consequential orientations to location as cap-
tured on video, the Board’s analyses had to grapple with the “local cultural 
                                               
11 As Garfinkel once put it (1952: 367 cited in Koschmann, 2011: 435): “The big question is not 
whether actors understand each other or not. The fact is they do understand each other, that they 
will understand each other but the catch is that they will understand each other regardless of how 
they would be understood.” 
12 By corollary, killing the ‘right people’ in the ‘wrong way’ would also be open to censure. 
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materials” (Basso, 1988: 100) that were constitutive features of the pilots’ actions. 
Insofar as their inquiries involved an explication of locational work as a localised 
and localising cultural practice (Garfinkel, 1967: 5; Eglin, 1980), they offer a par-
ticular way of accounting for this particular incident, one in which (mis)locating 
is treated as intimately tied to (mis)identifying as twinned sides of the same prax-
iological coin. If the (mis)locating is understandable, on this reading, then so is the 
(mis)identifying. Nonetheless, despite its empirical elements, their account remains 
a normative one; soldiers carrying out their duties ‘properly’ and in line with the 
letter and spirit of the rules ought not to kill their fellows. Axiomatically, friendly 
fire incidents should not occur. But this is a brand of normativity that stops short 
of being legislative – i.e. although they should not, it is recognised such incidents 
do and will happen recurrently. 
In raising these issues our aim is to point to the specific ways in which the 
methods the Board employed to arrive at such conclusions topicalised war on 
video – that is opened it up, and made it accountable (Lynch, 1993: xx). In partic-
ular, the Board’s workings highlight the sets of expectations against which sol-
dierly work is to be assessed and so is made assessable within a military setting. 
That is, military personnel, here pilots and ground controllers, in the midst of 
combat and the contingencies which characterise it, are to be procedurally com-
petent, making clear to those around them what they are doing as they are doing 
it. However, they are not just to ‘follow procedure’; they are to do so artfully and 
in ways that take into account the very uncertainties that make action and com-
munication expectably problematic in the field. If they have followed procedures 
as well as could have been expected under the circumstances, they cannot be 
blamed for the consequences – they were working, as directed, to implement or-
ders to the best of their abilities in line with the contingencies of the situation.  
We thus learn three things from the video-commentary pairings. First, we gain 
a much better sense of the kind of event friendly fire constitutes within the organ-
isational culture of the military – a regrettable but potentially accountable and 
understandable one. Secondly, and as a result, we learn something about that or-
ganisational culture – about how the military reasons about its operations and the 
actions of its personnel as well as about the understandings that are drawn on to 
evaluate them and make them make sense, leveraged here by the Board investiga-
tors’ through their analytic work with video. The upshot here: within it there is 
scope for terrible mistakes to be committed by recognisably ‘competent’ personnel 
going about their job in the culturally expected way. But, thirdly, we also come to 
see more clearly what generated and sustained the controversy over this case – a 
dispute over how the video should be interrogated so as to yield appropriate con-
clusions about the rights and wrongs of POPOFF flight’s actions. 
As mentioned briefly above, the Board’s judgements were grounded in different 
ways of working through the video to those employed by the UK Coroner. We 
have, in other words, two distinct methods with distinct practical purposes. The 
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Coroner’s method moved inwards to focus on the rights and wrongs of the indi-
vidual act of firing, and he sought to set that act against external standards (like 
the Laws of Armed Conflict) for the purposes of judging its legal and moral pro-
priety. The Board’s method moved outwards, setting the pilots’ acts in the wider 
fields of activity of which they were a part for the purposes of judging their oper-
ational propriety (see Snook 2002: 41). One isolates, the other embeds: one em-
ploys external, the other internal standards. It was the clash between these com-
peting approaches that provided the grounds of the dispute over what the video 
could be said to be evidence of – an unlawful killing or a tragic but ultimately 
blameless mistake.13 
We do not wish to suggest an equivalence between these contrasting methods, 
we want to stress the point that they are embedded in and constitutive of different 
kinds of practice. With that attention to difference firmly in mind, we have at-
tempted to show that it is possible to come to an understanding of the way the 
military reasons about itself in specific situations from the inside via an analysis 
of the kinds of cultural inquiries it undertakes into its own practices and how that 
contrasts with other approaches. How combat footage is analysed, to quote Ver-
tesi (2015: 161), “reflect[s] and project[s]” local social, cultural and organisational 
orders. As practiced ways of seeing, they are interwoven with those orders. A par-
ticular orientation to what we might call, following Sudnow (1965), “normal 
deaths” was certainly on display in the military way of seeing in this case. Insofar 
as understanding that orientation is instructive, offering insights not just into spe-
cific ways of seeing particular kinds of actions but also of seeing those who under-
take such actions, we feel it is worth drawing out its bases and opening it out to 
discussion. We hope to have made some progress in pursuing that objective here. 
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